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Linguistic meaning is determined by use. But given the fact that any giv-
en expression can be used in a variety of ways, this claim marks where 
metasemantic inquiry begins rather than where it ends. It sets an agen-
da for the metasemantic project: to distinguish in a principled and ex-
planatory way those uses that determine linguistic meaning from those 
that do not. The prevailing view (along with its various refi nements), 
which privileges assertion, suffers from being at once overly liberal and 
overly idealized. By parsing the most prominent aims we use language to 
achieve, noting their relations of dependence and the specifi c type of uses 
they involve, I arrive at a novel metasemantic account: facts of linguistic 
meaning are determined by locutionary action. 
Keywords: Metasemantics, convention, illocutionary acts, speech 
acts, meaning.
If L is a possible language, and P is a population of agents, 
what relation must hold between L and P in order to make 
it the case that L is an actual language of P? The obvious 
answer is: the members of P must use the language L. But 
that answer is neither informative nor clear. They must 
use L in a certain way. If everyone in P used L by telling 
lies in L or by singing operas in L (without understand-
ing the words), they would be using L but not in the right 
way; L would not be their language. David Lewis (1969: 
176–177)
I completely agree with Wittgenstein as far as he goes on 
that; the trouble is that he stops just short of the problem. I 
also think that the meaning [of an expression] is the use… 
I think this is one suffi ciently broad characterization to 
cover the whole lot; the problem is, it’s too broad… so it’s 
a question of what use counts and what use is irrelevant 
and should be dismissed.... and there’s where the problem 
begins, not where it ends. W.V. Quine (2013)
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Metasemantics is the study of what grounds facts of linguistic mean-
ing. While it is uncontroversial that these facts are determined by use, 
given the myriad ways that any given expression can be used, this claim 
cannot be taken as ending systematic metasemantic inquiry; rather, it 
specifi es its point of departure. One fundamental task of the metase-
mantic project is to provide a principled account of the sorts of uses that 
are meaning-determining, distinguishing them from uses that are not.
An initially plausible proposal, some variant of which has been ei-
ther explicitly endorsed or tacitly assumed by the vast majority of phi-
losophers and linguists for decades or more, is that assertion grounds 
facts of linguistic meaning. However, this view—along with its various 
refi nements—suffers at once from being overly idealized and overly lib-
eral. It fails both to account for standard and ubiquitous ways of using 
language that don’t fi t the idealized model of cooperative information 
exchange, and to sift out the kinds of use that are not relevant to deter-
mining linguistic meaning.
I offer a novel metasemantic account: facts of linguistic meaning 
are determined by locutionary action. My strategy is to parse the most 
prominent aims we use language to achieve, noting their relations of 
dependence and the specifi c type of uses they involve. This allows me 
to identify uses that meaning-determining and distinguish them in a 
principled and explanatory way from uses that are not. The resulting 
account provides a suitably robust—yet suffi ciently fi ne-grained—ac-
count of linguistic meaning, while shedding light on the diverse roles 
that different kinds of uses will have in an overall theory of communi-
cation. Moreover, the account yields a new foundation for traditional 
topics in semantics and pragmatics which cannot be fully successfully 
theorized about independently of metasemantic considerations.
1. Coordination Problems and Convention
We use language as a tool for achieving a number of different aims. Many 
of these aims are situated in an order of dependence, in the sense that 
success in achieving one aim is a prerequisite for success in achieving an-
other. We use language in different ways, corresponding to the different 
aims we are trying to achieve; this can lead to confusion in metsemantic 
theorizing, since not all of these uses are relevant to the question of what 
grounds facts about linguistic meaning. It is crucial, then, to get clear on 
the way these different ways of using language are related, and at what 
level each should appear in a full account of linguistic communication.
I will be making the simplifying assumption that language use is 
conventional, that a population speaks a certain language just in case 
there is a convention among them of performing a certain type of ac-
tion.1 This simplifi es the task guiding metasemantic inquiry to that 
1 Most of my arguments (with the exception of one I make in 2.4) will not rely 
on this assumption—rather, they concern which type of action should appear in 
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of identifying the relevant action type, which—I will claim—is locu-
tionary action. The notions of convention and coordination problems 
can be found in standard introductory economics textbook, and will be 
familiar to scholars working in any discipline that makes use of game 
theory. In the absence of uncontroversial yet rigorous defi nitions of 
these notions, I will be utilizing Lewis’ account of both throughout the 
paper. Though there have been quibbles over the fi ner points of Lew-
is’ defi nitions, they should nonetheless suffi ce here to provide a clear 
framework within which to talk about conventional uses of language.
A coordination problem, according to Lewis, is a situation in which 
two or more agents have a common interest in performing the same 
one of several alternative actions (or beliefs).2 They must coordinate 
in order to achieve a mutually desired outcome, or equilibrium state. 
Coordination problems can theoretically be solved by pure luck; it is in 
principle possible that agents could inadvertently reach an equilibrium 
state by accidentally slipping on a banana peel or falling into a ditch. 
In most cases, however, coordination problems are solved by reasoning 
about another agent’s mental states, predicting her actions, and then 
choosing one’s own actions accordingly. In this way, agents are able to 
fi nd a stable solution to a recurrent coordination problem by using the 
same strategy repeatedly on the expectation that others will do the 
same; in other words, a convention:
A regularity R in behavior is a convention for a population P if it’s common 
knowledge among the members of P that they follow R, that they expect one 
another to follow R, that R is a solution to the coordination problem that 
they face in S, and that there is another solution R′ that they could have 
conformed to instead of R. (Lewis 1969: 76)
In what follows I will tease apart several important coordination prob-
lems that we use language to solve, which happen to be nested inside 
of each other in the sense that solving one problem is a prerequisite for 
solving another. I think of these nested coordination problems like lay-
an account of linguistic meaning, regardless of whether the notion of convention is 
employed in such an account.
2 In Convention, Lewis defi nes coordination problems in terms of action, going 
on to defi ne conventions as regularities in action that are solutions to coordination 
problems. In “Language and Languages” he changes his account of convention so that 
the regularity is one of action or belief but does not make the relevant adjustment 
to his defi nition of coordination problem, which simply does not come up in that 
paper. This change in his account of convention was needed to accommodate the fact 
that in “Language and Languages” Lewis modifi es his earlier account of language 
use as a convention of truthfulness (which is an action) to that of a convention of 
truthfulness and trust (which is belief). In this paper I will be using Lewis’ amended 
account of language use and convention, which are given in terms of action and belief 
rather than merely action. Though he did not explicitly make the corresponding 
changes in his account of coordination problems, I do so here and consider this to 
be in keeping with his later views. For ease of exposition, I will often talk about 
coordination problems and conventions in terms of action only, but it should be 
implicitly understood that belief is also included (Lewis 1969: 24).
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ers of an onion—peeling back one layer exposes another coordination 
problem underneath. I will suggest that up until this point, theorists 
of language have failed to peel the onion back far enough. The task 
is to peel back the layers of irrelevant use, stopping just at the point 
where the kind of use we have identifi ed is robust enough to do the job 
of grounding linguistic communication. In what follows, I will consider 
roughly three layers of coordination problems—not because they are 
exhaustive, but because the fi rst two correspond to the main metase-
mantic theories that have either been explicitly proposed or tacitly as-
sumed in the literature up until now. The third, I will argue, is the one 
that corresponds to the correct metasemantic theory.
2. Coordinating with Language
Before teasing apart these different coordination problems and examin-
ing them more carefully, I’ll fi rst set up a bit of terminology. I will be 
using a broadly Austinian taxonomy of speech acts: The locutionary act 
is—roughly for now, but to be precisifi ed later—to perform an utterance 
simply in order to transmit its conventionally encoded content (Austin 
1975: 94−107).3, 4 The locutionary act is successful when the audience en-
tertains the content that the utterer has in mind. But merely transmit-
ting a content rarely serves our goals—we often want to signal that we 
take some sort of attitude toward the content. Perhaps we want the audi-
ence to think that we believe a proposition, for instance, or to understand 
that we desire her to answer a question. So the locutionary act is gener-
ally in service of an illocutionary act; the performance of an utterance 
with some kind of force, such as assertion, command, query, etc. The 
illocutionary act is successful when the audience understands not only 
the content the speaker transmits, but the force that speaker attaches 
to that content. The illocutionary act, in turn, is usually performed in 
the service of the perlocutionary act; roughly, the act of doing something 
by uttering an expression, such as getting someone to close a door or to 
share one’s beliefs, etc. The perlocutionary act is successful if the audi-
ence responds in the appropriate/desired way to the illocutionary act of 
the speaker, i.e., by producing the intended perlocutionary effect.
2.1. Coordinating illocutionary act with perlocutionary effect
Arguably, the aim of most ordinary language tends to be the production 
of perlocutionary effects—such as belief, action, and testimony. We nav-
igate the world better when we are able to exchange information and 
3 For ease of exposition I will ignore context sensitivity here and make the 
simplifying assumption that the meanings of sentences are complete thoughts 
rather than functions.
4 Some readers may fi nd my interpretation of Austin to be controversial. While I 
believe I have provided a reasonable regimentation of Austin’s taxonomy of speech 
acts, I don’t have the space to defend that claim here. However, the fi delity of my 
interpretation of Austin should not be relevant to the arguments in this paper.
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coordinate our behavior; it is hard to imagine how a community would 
have developed the use of language if not from pressure arising from 
this need.5 This may explain early theorists’ attraction to a metaseman-
tic story in which perlocutionary effects play a primary role in linguis-
tic convention. David Lewis’ theory is a paradigm example of such an 
account: he worked out a rigorous metasemantic proposal, the general 
spirit of which is perhaps tacitly assumed by theorists who take the 
potential perlocutionary effect of an expression (e.g., change in context) 
to be indicative of its semantic value (e.g., context change potential). 
According to Lewis, parties in a conversation have a mutual interest in 
one member performing a certain perlocutionary response conditional 
on a certain state of affairs obtaining. They are able to achieve an equi-
librium state if the utterer performs her illocutionary action only under 
certain circumstances (for instance, she will assert only true things, and 
command only actions that—if performed—will serve the interlocutors’ 
relevant mutual interest) and the audience coordinates her perlocution-
ary response with the action of the utterer (by believing the content of 
the assertion, or obeying the command).6 For instance, perhaps A and U 
ultimately have a mutual interest in both of them being able to unlock 
the house, though there is only one set of keys; then they will also share 
the more immediate interest for A to believe that the housekeys are hid-
den in the birdfeeder conditional on its being the case. Or for A to hide 
the housekeys in the birdfeeder conditional on its being the case that U 
will look for them there. Therefore, U will assert that the housekeys are 
hidden in the birdfeeder just in case they are, and she will command A 
to hide them there just in case that’s where she is planning to look for 
them. In turn, A will respond to U’s assertion that the housekeys are 
hidden in the birdfeeder by believing it, and will respond to her com-
mand to hide them there by doing it. Coordinating their action in this 
way serves their mutual interests: it allows them to navigate the world 
by exchanging information and acting together to achieve mutual goals.
While the motivation for this picture is clear, it does not provide a 
satisfactory basis for a theory of linguistic communication. As Austin 
5 I am uncommitted with respect to what was in fact the causal history of actual 
language use. Though, for instance, Noam Chomsky denies that language evolved 
as a response to a need for communication or information exchange, I take it to be 
uncontroversial that this is a primary function of language and strongly infl uences 
the development of individual languages over time. Moreover, in downplaying the 
conventionality of language, Chomsky is focused on syntax rather than semantics 
or pragmatics.
6 Lewis uses a technical account of truthfulness and trust that is designed 
to describe the coordination between conversational participants in a way that 
generalizes across illocutionary act types. In each case one party is being truthful 
and one party is being trusting (in ways that will be cashed out differently depending 
on the type of illocutionary act). I will not go into the details of this account; what 
matters to the discussion here is that in each case the coordinating action on the part 
of the audience will be to perform a perlocutionary response (to believe the content of 
the assertion, fulfi ll the request, answer the question, etc.)
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and Grice later started to point out, we can put language to many uses, 
not all of which determine conventional meaning or are even relevant 
to communication. What speaks decisively against the particular pic-
ture we are considering here is Austin’s insight that communication 
has been successful when the hearer has identifi ed the illocutionary 
action, regardless of whether she performs the corresponding perlocu-
tionary response. If she knows what has been asserted, there has been 
successful communication regardless of whether she believes it. If she 
knows what has been commanded, there has been successful commu-
nication regardless of whether she does it. If she knows what has been 
asked, there has been successful communication regardless of whether 
she answers it, and so on. Furthermore, it seems that communication 
takes place even in situations in which we are actively and openly be-
ing uncooperative at the level which involves perlocutionary uptake.7 
So the lesson gleaned from Austin and Grice is that the layer of co-
ordination involving perlocutionary action is irrelevant. The natural 
next step would be—and indeed was—to peel the onion back a layer 
and look instead to the problem of identifying the illocutionary act as 
a candidate for grounding language use. Something like this type of 
picture remains to be predominantly assumed in the literature today, 
though—as I will argue below—it is does not go far enough in stripping 
away irrelevant use.
2.2. Coordination on identifying illocutionary act 
In order to coordinate her perlocutionary response with the speaker’s 
illocutionary act, the audience must fi rst identify which illocutionary 
act has been performed. Before forming a belief, for instance, she must 
understand what the speaker has asserted. Before answering she must 
understand the question and before obeying she must understand the 
command. This poses a separate coordination problem; the speaker and 
audience both want the audience to understand which illocutionary act 
the speaker is performing. They can solve the problem by relying on ex-
pectations and beliefs about the other’s behavior: the speaker will gen-
erally encode her illocutionary act based on her expectations about how 
the audience will respond to her utterance, and the audience will gen-
erally form her beliefs about the speaker’s illocutionary act based on 
her expectations of how the speaker will encode it. This is a coordina-
tion problem nested within a coordination problem, since it is only after 
the audience has successfully identifi ed the speaker’s illocutionary act 
that she can respond appropriately. But as we have seen, it seems as 
though successful communication occurs when the illocutionary act is 
identifi ed, regardless of whether the audience responds in the appro-
priate or desired way. Indeed, agents need not even have an interest 
coordinating at the perlocutionary level in order to communicate suc-
7 See Camp (forthcoming), McKinney (manuscript), and Pinker, Nowak, and Lee 
(2008).
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cessfully. Such considerations make it appealing to look instead to the 
problem of identifying the illocutionary act to do the work of grounding 
linguistic meaning.
This general kind of picture which grounds meaning in illocutionary ac-
tion is refl ected in Grice and those following a similar framework, such 
as Stephen Schiffer and Brian Loar.8 Differences in terminology can 
be misleading here: these philosophers took linguistic meaning to be 
grounded in acts of speaker meaning, but because they defi ne speaker 
meaning in terms of a manifest intention to produce a propositional at-
titude (or other type of response) in the audience, it falls into the catego-
ry of what I am calling illocutionary action, rather than what I am call-
ing speaker meaning. Though Grice and his followers do not explicitly 
talk about the identifi cation of the illocutionary action as a coordination 
problem, this way of framing things fi ts quite naturally with a Gricean 
account of communication. One of the key features of Grice’s notion of 
speaker meaning, which sets it apart from natural meaning, is the in-
volvement of coordination in choosing and interpreting the utterance. 
When a speaker means p she succeeds in communicating not simply by 
causing a belief, but by performing her utterance in a way that is meant 
to reveal her mental states, and to thereby provide the basis for the au-
dience’s reaction. In turn, the audience identifi es the speaker’s meaning 
not purely on the basis of external factors, but on her recognition of the 
speaker’s intentions in producing that utterance, which serves as the 
basis for her response. The aspect of Grice’s account of speaker meaning 
which makes it a fundamentally cooperative act is the requirement that 
the speaker intends for her communicative intention to be manifest to 
the audience—the recognition of which is meant to provide the audience 
a reason for identifying the speaker’s illocutionary act one way rather 
than another. This kind of manifest, or refl exive intention functions as 
a mechanism for coordination. Though it is framed in a different way, 
the idea that communication fundamentally involves coordination by 
reasoning about each other’s mental states and acting accordingly is 
as central to Grice’s theory as it is to Lewis’. I take the general Gricean 
framework, then, to be a paradigmatic case of a metasemantic picture 
according to which language is grounded in conventions of illocution-
ary action.9 Something in the vicinity also seems to be tacitly assumed 
by semanticists who posit illocutionary update potential as semantic 
values of expressions, as well as those who take illocutionary force to be 
relevant to locating the semantics/pragmatics boundary. As far as I can 
tell, this general type of picture seems to be widely taken for granted, 
but I will argue below that it is untenable.
8 See Grice (1989), Loar (1981), Schiffer (1972).
9 Grice had hesitations about appealing to convention in his account of linguistic 
meaning, and instead talked about members of a population having a certain 
procedure in their repertoires; however, because his account still grounds linguistic 
meaning in illocutionary action, the diffi culties I outline here still apply (Grice 1989: 
123–127).
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This general approach runs into problems with something that is 
sometimes (somewhat disingenuously) called “non-standard speech”—
specifi cally, cases in which language is used to illocute content that is 
non-identical to the standing meaning of the utterance, as well as cases 
in which language is used to do something else entirely from perform-
ing illocutions. Lewis was aware of these diffi culties, which apply to 
his account as well (insofar as it grounds linguistic meaning at least in 
part in illocutionary action); he considers both cases in Languages and 
Language, though I will argue that his responses are inadequate. The 
two underlying problems are that linguistic meaning underdetermines 
illocutionary force, and that—like perlocutionary effect—illocution-
ary action does not seem to be necessary for communication or the use 
of language; these problems are intractable for a theory that seeks to 
ground linguistic meaning in conventions of illocutionary action.10
The fi rst problem is that it seems as though there could be linguistic 
communities who speak non-literally more often than not; they primar-
ily use sarcasm, metaphor, etc. According to the picture that grounds 
linguistic meaning in conventions of illocutionary action, however, such 
a community would not speak the language L that we’d naturally take 
them to be speaking; there would not be a convention among this popu-
lation of using s to mean L(s). Lewis responds by suggesting that the 
language we’d initially take to be the language of this population (call 
it literal-L) is only a simplifi ed approximation to their actual language 
L, which may be obtained by specifying certain systematic departures 
from literal-L. (A simplifi ed example: if s means p in literal-L, and is 
systematically used ironically by this population, then s means not p in 
L (Lewis 1975: 183)). The language of this community is determined by 
conventions of illocution, but they just happen to be speaking a differ-
ent language than they initially appear to be.
But this response won’t do: the most serious problem is that Lewis’s 
solution assumes that the non-literal speech of this community will dis-
play enough systematicity to be able to derive L from Literal-L. How-
ever, this is at best extremely unlikely; it is certainly not necessary. 
Non-literal speech comes in many forms, and some of them—like meta-
phor—tend to be highly unsystematic; while we may be able to char-
acterize the general features of different kinds of non-literal speech, 
there is no principled mapping from the meaning of a sentence s in 
Literal-English, for instance, to non-literal-English(s). The other issue 
is that the account rules out the possibility that for instance, Ameri-
cans would share a language with the British in the case that the Brit-
ish started using irony to a suffi ciently high degree—this seems like 
the wrong result.
10 The objections can be modifi ed to fi t any theory that grounds linguistic meaning 
in illocutionary action, regardless of which/how many illocutionary acts are utilized 
in that theory. Furthermore, the objections will apply regardless of differences in the 
details of how these illocutionary acts are defi ned, as long as they meet the criteria 
outlined above in that they involve the speaker having a communicative intention 
over and above that of simply transmitting a content.
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The second problem is that it seems that there could be linguistic 
communities who were not in the business of performing illocutionary 
actions at all; rather they may use a language L uniquely for the pur-
pose of putting on plays, or telling jokes or stories.11 If a population’s 
language is determined by their conventions of illocution, this popula-
tion does not count as speaking a language at all. Lewis’ initial re-
sponse here is analogous that given above; the language of this popula-
tion L may be obtained by specifying their systematic departures from 
literal-L (which we would naturally identify as their language). In this 
case, however, Lewis recognizes that there may not be the requisite 
systematicity; he suggests an alternative solution, which is to restrict 
the account of the convention which governs language use to serious 
communication situations, which he defi nes as follows:
We may say that a serious communication situation exists with respect to 
a sentence s of L whenever it is true, and common knowledge between a 
speaker and a hearer, that (a) the speaker does, and the hearer does not, 
know whether s is true in L; (b) the hearer wants to know; (c) the speaker 
wants the hearer to know; and (d) neither the speaker or the hearer has 
other (comparably strong) desires as to whether or not the speaker utters s. 
(Lewis 1975: 184)
The account would then be modifi ed so that what determines which 
language a population speaks will be conventions of illocutionary ac-
tion in serious communication situations. But again, this rules out 
plausible cases of shared language: we can imagine that a language 
was once used in a community to assert what were then taken to be 
religious truths, but which was later used to convey the very same sto-
ries, but this time as myths or parables. This situation does not refl ect 
a change in language, but rather a change in religious belief. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, this restriction only serves to make salient 
the fact that serious communication situations are not the only contexts 
in which we use language. Information exchange is only one of many 
11 When joking around or telling stories, the speaker means something by her 
utterances—she intends her audience to attend to certain thoughts. Granted she is 
not merely intending to transmit these thoughts to the hearer; she will most likely 
have further intentions, perhaps including the intention to amuse her audience. 
However, this kind of further intention does not constitute an illocutionary act, 
since it is not a refl exive communicative intention. The speaker may intend that 
her audience be amused by the thought she has transmitted, but the basis for 
that amusement won’t involve a recognition of the speaker’s mental states (the 
fact that the hearer has these mental states will not typically be amusing); the 
source of amusement will be the transmitted thought itself. There need not be any 
coordination between the speaker and audience after the locutionary act has been 
identifi ed. Grice touches on this point in Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions, pointing 
out that while the audience’s amusement may be partially caused by the recognition 
of the speaker’s intentions (though I doubt that even this much is usually the case) it 
will not be on the basis of this recognition: “But though A’s thought that U intended 
him to be amused might be a part-cause of his being amused, it could not be a part of 
his reason for being amused (one does not, indeed, have reasons for being amused)...” 
(Grice 1989: 92–3).
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activities which we use language to facilitate. Our use of language is 
complicated and messy; we joke, we play, we say things we mean as 
well as things we don’t mean—we often do these things unsystemati-
cally, and in the course of a single conversation. It is one thing to ideal-
ize away from complexities when constructing a model of language and 
language use, it is another thing to ignore or accept patently incorrect 
results for large swaths of perfectly ordinary use. Non-literal and “non-
serious” speech are not peripheral cases; they are the norm, which any 
viable meta-semantic theory will need to account for.12
In the introduction I noted that metasemantic considerations will 
have signifi cant implications concerning the viability of individual se-
mantic theories. For instance, underlying any semantic theory which 
posits context change potential as semantic value seems to be the tacit 
assumption that meaning is in some way determined by illocutionary 
action or perlocutionary effect. This is because an update in the con-
text, which can be modeled as the information state of the conversa-
tional participants, results from the recognition of the illocutionary 
action—and in some cases the subsequent production of the perlo-
cutionary effect—in serious communication situations. For instance, 
assertion is standardly taken to effect a change in context when its 
intended perlocutionary effect (belief or acceptance of the asserted con-
tent by conversational participants) is achieved. In the case of ques-
tions and commands, the update in the context is not generally taken 
to require something quite strong as the production of the intended 
perlocutionary effect (an answer to the question or the performance the 
commanded action). However, it does involve recognition of the illocu-
tionary action and a somewhat weaker response—for instance, the rel-
evant conversationalists taking on the goal of answering the question 
or performing the commanded action. Given the underlying assump-
tion that use determines meaning, semantic theories that posit context 
change potential as semantic values tacitly endorse the additional as-
sumption that the kind of use that grounds linguistic meaning involves 
illocutionary action/perlocutionary effect. However, if the arguments 
above are correct and neither illocutionary action nor perlocutionary 
effect are necessary for language use, then it is hard to see what kind 
of metasemantics could support such a semantic theory.
2.3. Coordination in identifying locutionary act 
So far we have considered two different coordination problems that lan-
guage can be used to solve, one nested inside the other. The fi rst was 
that of coordinating illocutionary action with perlocutionary response. 
12 In order to get around these problems one might try to incorporate mock 
illocutionary acts somehow (perhaps with a disjunctive account according to which 
meaning is grounded in conventions of illocutions or mock illocutions). I fi nd little to 
recommend this approach. It is shamelessly ad hoc, and it generates the problem of 
giving a rigorous account of what mock illocutions amount to, exactly.
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We saw that in order to reach the equilibrium state with this particu-
lar coordination problem, agents must fi rst solve a different coordina-
tion problem: that of identifying the illocutionary act. But we can peel 
back yet another layer to fi nd additional coordination problems nested 
within: that of identifying speaker meaning—and, where there is more 
than one level of meaning—identifying the speaker’s direct meaning, 
which I will call the ‘locutionary act’. I will argue that this is the co-
ordination problem underlying language use. Though I am offering a 
novel metasemantic proposal, it is compatible (to varying degrees) with 
views about language and language use going back to philosophers like 
Locke, Austin and Strawson. Insofar as Locke considered language to 
signify mere contents of thought (devoid of illocutionary force), his view 
would naturally fi t together with a metasemantic picture according to 
which language use is grounded in locutionary action, rather than illo-
cutionary acts or perlocutionary effects. Austin thought that illocution-
ary acts were conventional, but that they were underdetermined by 
meaning; this seems to imply that the conventions of illocutionary ac-
tion must be over and above those that determine meaning, at least in 
some cases. Strawson echoes this sentiment, agreeing with Austin that 
“we must refer. . . to linguistic conventions to determine what locution-
ary act has been performed in the making of an utterance, to determine 
what the meaning of the utterance is” but denying that illocutionary 
acts are always conventional (Strawson 1964: 442).
Given that it is possible for there to be language communities that 
employ language to different ends, it is important to identify what is 
common to all of these communities; I want to suggest that this is the act 
of speaker-meaning, which—to remind the reader—I defi ne as follows:
 Meaning: By uttering e, U meant m iff for some audience A, U 
uttered e R-intending that A attend to m at least partially on the 
basis of her utterance.
The expression ‘refl exive intention’ is borrowed from Bach and Harnish 
(1979), and refers to intentions that are self-referential in the following 
way: a speaker has a refl exive communicative intention just in case 
part of her intention is that the audience recognize the full contents of 
that very intention. The speaker intends for her communicative inten-
tion to be manifest to the audience, the recognition of which is meant 
to provide the audience a reason for identifying the speaker’s meaning 
one way rather than another. This defi nition of speaker meaning is 
adapted from Grice’s account, but it differs crucially from his (as well 
as from others working within a broadly Gricean framework) in that 
it is less restrictive; a speaker means something merely by having the 
intention that her audience attend to a certain thought. The audience 
need not be intended to have any additional response, or to form any 
attitude toward the content over and above that of having it in mind.13 
13 Stephen Neale suggests a similar weakening in Neale (1992) p. 34−37. 
However, because he does not accept the implications that I take to follow from it—
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If the speaker manages to get her audience to recognize her intentions 
and attend to the content that she has in mind, then this most basic of 
communicative acts—that of speaker meaning—has been successful. In 
contrast, more traditionally Gricean accounts of speaker meaning es-
sentially involve some sort of additional communicative intention over 
and above what I am calling ‘speaker meaning’—the intention that the 
audience do something with the content of the utterance after she has 
attended to it (such as to believe it, provide an answer to it, etc.) These 
additional communicative intentions constitute the illocutionary force 
of the utterance.
Of course, given that we have an interest in passing on information 
and coordinating action, speakers will often have communicative inten-
tions that go above and beyond that of speaker-meaning, and instead 
constitute full illocutionary action. For instance, a speaker may utter 
a sentence not only with the intention that her audience attend to the 
proposition expressed by that sentence—but with the additional inten-
tion that the hearer recognize that the speaker believes the proposition, 
thereby coming to have reason to believe it herself. However, the per-
formance and success of the act of speaker meaning are preconditions 
for the performance and success of an illocutionary act; so given that 
the agents have a shared interest in identifying the illocutionary act, 
they will have a shared interest in identifying the speaker’s meaning 
in this more liberal sense. Here again we have a coordination problem 
nested within a coordination problem; in order to coordinate on solving 
the problem of identifying the illocutionary act, agents must coordinate 
on solving the problem of identifying what the speaker meant.
If we take the relevant coordination problem to be that of identify-
ing speaker meaning, we get the desired results with respect to com-
munities that do things with language other than perform illocutions. 
Paradigm cases in which a speaker means something by an utterance 
without performing an illocutionary act are conversational contexts in 
which the speaker is joking around or telling stories. In these contexts 
the speaker is not merely intending to transmit these thoughts to the 
hearer; she will most likely have further intentions, perhaps including 
the intention to amuse her audience. However, these further intentions 
do not constitute illocutionary action, since the source of amusement is 
typically not the recognition of the speaker’s mental states, but rather 
the audience’s impulsive reaction to her understanding of the thought 
being communicated. So while in this kind of situation there is no coor-
dination needed to identify an illocutionary action, there is still coordi-
nation needed to identify the speaker’s meaning. Since in non-serious 
communication situations speakers still mean what they say in the lib-
eral sense that I’ve defi ned, by taking the language of a community to 
for instance, that the literal content of indirect speech will be meant by the speaker 
this weakened sense—I assume he has in mind a more restricted account than the 
one I am proposing here.
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be determined by conventions of speaker meaning, we will get the right 
results with respect to communities that use language solely in non-
serious communication situations.
However, this does not provide the tools to deal with the other coun-
terexample, which essentially involved indirection. In the example we 
considered, the indirection was with respect to the illocutionary acts 
being performed; that is, members of the hypothetical community used 
non-literal speech more often than not (in that, roughly, the content 
of their illocution tended to be non-identical to the semantic content 
of their utterance). But the example could easily be modifi ed to create 
a problem for an account which takes the relevant language conven-
tion to be that of speaker-meaning. Indirection and non-seriousness 
are orthogonal issues; we could just as well consider a community of 
people who only joke around and tell stories, yet do all of this using 
indirect speech. In this kind of case, the speaker-meaning account will 
get the wrong results in regard to which language is the language of 
this population.
It is necessary to impose constraints on the account in order that the 
contents of implicature, ironical and metaphorical utterances and the 
like, do not get swept up by the theory—this can be done by restricting 
the account to direct meaning. Not all acts of speaker-meaning are on a 
par. With any given utterance, a speaker may perform multiple acts of 
speaker meaning; however she may use varying strategies to facilitate 
the hearer’s recognition of the different things that she means. For a 
subset of the contents meant by the speaker, their communication will 
be linguistically mediated in a more direct sense than other contents 
that she meant in the course of that same utterance. That is, in the case 
that a speaker means multiple things with an utterance, there will be 
one content that she intends the speaker to entertain primarily on the 
basis of her utterance (together with shared background information), 
while there will be other contents that the hearer is intended to arrive 
at on the basis of other contents she recognizes to have been meant by 
the speaker. We can think of this subset as what is directly meant by 
the speaker. In the case that the speaker is part of a community with 
established linguistic conventions, what she directly means by her ut-
terance will likely correspond with the content of what people have 
tended to think of as the locutionary act she performs with that utter-
ance, in the sense that it will correspond to the conventional meaning 
of the expression she utters.14, 15 In contrast, additional contents she 
14 This need not be the case. But the reason that it will often be the case is that 
usually the most effi cient way for the utterer to get her audience to identify a certain 
content is to utter a sentence whose standing meaning is that very content.
15 Again, for simplicity I am ignoring context sensitivity here, making the 
simplifying assumption that the meanings of sentences are complete thoughts 
rather than functions. In any case, the content of the locutionary act will generally 
bear some close relation to the conventional meaning of the utterance, though it may 
not be identity.
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might have meant (for instance, those that she implicated with the 
utterance) neither correspond to the conventional meaning of the ex-
pression she used, nor were they directly meant. Rather, the hearer is 
intended to arrive at these additional meanings at least partially on 
the basis of other things meant by the speaker in that utterance. I will 
defi ne locutionary action as direct meaning.
 Indirect Meaning: By uttering e, U indirectly meant m iff for 
some audience A, there is some content k (not identical to m) 
such that
 1. By uttering e, U meant k 
 2. By uttering e, U meant m
 3. U uttered e R-intending that A recognize (2) at least partially 
  on the basis of (1).
 Direct Meaning: Whatever is meant: if it is not meant indirectly, 
is it meant directly.
My defi nition of locutionary action, then, differs from the traditional 
Austinian characterization in that the latter but not the former re-
quires that there be some conventional meaning associated with speak-
ers’ utterance.
Again we fi nd a coordination problem within a coordination prob-
lem: in the case of indirect speech, in order to identify the indirectly 
meant content q, the hearer must fi rst identify that the speaker meant 
p, since it is on the basis of this fact that she is meant to identify the in-
direct content q. There can be many layers of meaning, but in each case 
the hearer must identify the content that is on the bottom-most level—
the locuted content. Identifi cation of the locutionary act, then, will be 
a part of any coordination problem of identifying speaker meaning. In 
the case that there is only one level of meaning, it will be the very same 
problem. In the case of identifying indirect speaker meaning, it will be 
a coordination problem within a coordination problem.
If we take the relevant coordination problem to be that of identify-
ing the locutionary act of the speaker we get the right results not only 
with regard to the community that uses language only in non-serious 
communication situations, but also in regard to the community that 
uses indirect speech more often than not. But it is not simply a matter 
of making the right predicitions; the fact that this account manages to 
get the desired results in cases where the more traditional accounts 
failed is explanatory in that it is refl ective of two broader facts about 
language use: (1) that locutionary action is common to all communica-
tion situations, and (2) that the locutionary act of the speaker is part 
of the mechanism by which indirect speech occurs—even when it not 
the “point” of the utterance, it is crucially involved in the communica-
tive act. By grounding language use in locutionary action we peel back 
superfl uous layers of use—following the lead of Austin and Grice, but 
continuing where they had stopped too soon—to fi nd what is both com-
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mon to all contexts of linguistic communication and robust enough to 
do the work of grounding linguistic meaning: locutionary action.
2.4. Why not conventions of illocution as well as locution?
As we have seen, identifying the speaker’s illocutionary act involves 
coordination on the part of the speaker and her audience. Conversa-
tional participants use language to solve this coordination problem, in 
that the speaker chooses an utterance that she expects will provide 
the audience a way to identify her illocutionary act, and the audience 
will in turn identify the illocutionary act based on her expectations of 
the speaker. Surely, then, there can be conventions of illocutionary ac-
tion; there is in principle no reason why a regularity could not develop 
within a community of using s to illocute L(s) and of taking others to 
do so. So why not take this convention—in addition to conventions of 
locutionary action—as relevant to metasemantic theorizing? We could 
get around the counterexample involving non-serious speech situations 
by introducing a disjunction into the defi nition: instead of the account 
I’ve offered—in which a population speaks a language L just in case 
they have a convention of using s to locute L(s)—we could say instead 
that a population speaks a language L just in case they have a conven-
tion of using s to locute L(s) and/or using s to (directly) illocute L(s). The 
counterexample involving indirection could be handled by modifying 
the account to impose a directness condition on the illocutionary action 
involved. While on the face of it, it might look like this picture would 
get the right results, this strategy should be resisted for the following 
reasons:
First, what looks like a convention may in fact just be correlation. 
According to an old picture of sentential force, different kinds of sen-
tence types all have the same kind of content; the difference in per-
ceived meaning does not amount to a difference in content, but rather 
a difference in force. According to this picture it would be somewhat 
arbitrary which kind of force could be paired with a particular content 
on an occasion of utterance, given that there is only one kind of con-
tent (traditionally supposed to be propositional) which is compatible 
with each type of force. On any occasion of utterance, there would be 
alternatives; the speaker can choose the content and the correspond-
ing force based on her interests and goals on a given occasion. How-
ever, this traditional Fregean view—according to which expressions 
with different sentential force share the same type of content—has 
been shown to be untenable. Because these expressions can embed, 
the strategy of taking them to have a uniform kind of content leads to 
diffi culties in providing a systematic compositional semantics, and has 
been largely abandoned as a result (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997: 
1061–1075). It has been more promising to posit different kinds of con-
tents corresponding to different kinds of sentences. If this strategy is 
correct, and indicatives, queries, commands, etc. have different types 
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of entities as their semantic contents, then the correlation we see be-
tween illocutionary action and sentence type might just be piggyback-
ing on the convention of locution (which concerns merely content). For 
instance, we have conventions of locutions for indicative sentences that 
determine their contents to be propositions (or propositional functions); 
while indicatives may also correlate with the illocutionary act of asser-
tion, it is not because there is a separate convention involved. Rather it 
is because of the nature of assertion; one can only assert contents that 
are propositions (and not, for instance, questions). Mutatis mutandis 
for queries with questions (semantic content of interrogatives), as well 
as requests with whatever kind of entity turns out to be the semantic 
content of imperatives. If my metasemantic proposal is correct, then 
in cases of direct illocutionary action we would expect to see the above 
correspondence. However, this correspondence would not indicate 
a convention because there would be no alternative; when the direct 
meaning is propositional, only assertion will be an option for the direct 
illocutionary act, when the direct meaning is a question, only a query 
will be an option for the direct illocutionary act, and so forth.
But let’s suppose for the sake of argument that there could be con-
ventions of direct illocutionary action. Even in this case I think that 
there are reasons—gleaned from the consideration of the counterex-
amples in 2.2—to exclude these conventions from an account of what 
it is for a population to use a language. The fi rst reason is that not all 
language communities need conventions of illocutionary action, though 
they all need conventions of locutionary action. Ideally, we’d want a 
simple theory that would generalize to all language speaking commu-
nities and all languages. The second is that there is an intuitive sense 
that two communities that share conventions of locution but not of il-
locution may share the same language. This seems to be evident from 
the hypothetical situation described above, in which Americans for the 
most part speak literally while the British primarily use non-literal 
speech. What they have in common is a convention of locution; they 
both use the same utterances to directly mean the same contents. They 
differ in their conventions of illocutionary force; whereas Americans 
directly assert (for instance) the locuted content, the British assert a 
different, indirectly communicated content. Yet there is the intuition 
in this case that even so, the two communities are speaking the same 
language. The same could be said if we were to compare a community 
that used language in serious speech situations in order to perform 
illocutionary actions, and one that did not—for instance, it seems as 
though the very same language that was used by one community to as-
sert what they took to be religious truths (i.e., to perform illocutions), 
could later be used by another to convey the very same stories, but this 
time as myths or parables (i.e., to do something other than perform illo-
cutions). These communities, again, would share the same conventions 
of locution but not the same conventions of illocution—and yet there is 
the intuition that they could share a language.
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